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I. Introduction
Over the last decade, in gradual fashion, a new pillar of the GATT and WTO
emerged-sound science.1 Starting in the mid-1980s, the WTO and GATT ex-
panded the "national treatment" obligation of the GATT to effectively address
de facto discrimination. In addition, GATT and WTO panels began demanding
much more rigorous explanations from countries seeking to justify trade-
restrictive internal regulations as "exceptions" under GATT article XX. Panels
built on the underlying objectives of the GATT and WTO Agreements to close
potential loopholes, strengthen GATT national treatment disciplines, and advance
an open, transparent, rules-based trading system.
A. SPS AGREEMENT
In the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, these trends were
codified in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement). While the SPS negotiation began as an attempt to
clarify the GATT article XX exception, it evolved into a comprehensive set of
rights and disciplines governing sanitary and phytosanitary (S&P) regulations
designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health. In the recent Hormones
*Warren H. Maruyama is a partner with the firm of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P. He served as Associate
Director for International Economic Policy (1992) and Deputy Associate Director (1989-92), The
White House; Associate General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1983-89); and
Attorney-Advisor, U.S. International Trade Commission (1980-83).
1. Other core WTO principles are most-favored-nation (article I), national treatment (article
III), the tariff principle (article II), and transparency (article X). The basic idea is that international
trade should be non-discriminatory and that the principal instrument for regulating trade flows should
be bound, transparent tariffs, which can be negotiated down in periodic rounds of trade negotiations.
The other provisions of the GATT basically consist of exceptions (articles VI, XVIII, XIX, and
XXIV) and provisions designed to protect the value of (articles XI and XXIII).
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decision, the WTO's Appellate Body upheld the basic integrity of the SPS
Agreement by insisting that SPS measures be based on a risk assessment and an
objective relationship to sound science. Similarly, after a detour in United States-
Alcoholic Beverages, the WTO reversed course in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages
II by dumping the "aim and effect" test, which required a complaining party to
prove protectionist aim or intent and threatened to eviscerate the WTO's evolving
disciplines over de facto discrimination.
The WTO must continue to refine and strengthen SPS and National Treatment
disciplines, as it seeks to liberalize international agricultural trade and to counter
the boundless ingenuity of protectionist interests. At the same time, the WTO must
be careful not to constrain unduly the legitimate domestic regulatory authority of
WTO Members in the areas of food safety and public health. In this respect, the
SPS Agreement is a precursor of future challenges as the WTO tries to deal
with the politically-charged intersection of international trade and environmental
policy.
B. ARTICLES III AND XX
GATT articles III and XX are closely related. Article 111-the "national treat-
ment" or non-discrimination obligation-prohibits discriminatory internal taxes
and regulations.
Article XX sets out exceptions to the General Agreement. These exceptions
were designed to ensure that GATT would not preclude legitimate regulatory
activity. Accordingly, article XX provides that certain measures that otherwise
would violate GATT are nevertheless permitted if they fall within specific enumer-
ated exceptions. These include protecting public morals (paragraph (a)); pro-
tecting human, animal, or plant life (paragraph (b)); customs enforcement, pro-
tecting patents, trademarks, and copyrights, and preventing deceptive practices
(paragraph (c)); preventing trade in prison labor products (paragraph (e)); pro-
tecting "natural treasures of artistic, historic, or archaeological value" (para-
graph (f)); and conserving "exhaustible natural resources" (paragraph (g)). 2
While seeking to safeguard legitimate sovereign regulatory authority, the draft-
ers of GATT also sought to prevent "abuse of exceptions of Article [XX]". 3
The chapeau to article XX states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing
2. It is worth noting, however, that certain provisions of the Havana Charter, including a
proposed exception for measures "taken in pursuance of any intergovernmental agreement which
relates solely to the conservation of fisheries resources, migratory birds or wild animals," were not
carried forward into GATT and were never incorporated in article XX.
3. EPCT/C/50, p. 7 (quoted in GATT Analytical Index, Vol. 1, p. 564 (1995)).
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in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
4
contracting party of measures ... .
Accordingly, applying article XX requires a three-step analysis. First, does
the measure violate an underlying GATT obligation, e.g. MFN (article I)
or national treatment (article III) obligations, or the general prohibition on
quantitative restrictions (article XI)? Second, is the measure consistent with
the chapeau to article XX, i.e., non-discriminatory and not a disguised trade
restriction? Third, have the criteria been met for the specific exception being
invoked, e.g., is the measure "necessary" to secure compliance with patents,
copyrights, trademarks (paragraph (d)), "necessary" to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life (paragraph (b)), or "relating to" the conservation of exhaust-
ible natural resources (paragraph (g))?
II. Evolution of Article III
For many years, article III jurisprudence was straightforward. In an early
decision on Italian Discrimination Against ImportedAgricultural Machinery (Ital-
ian Tractors), a GATT panel invoked "national treatment" to strike down an
Italian law that resulted in de jure discrimination against imported British trac-
tors-hardly a surprising result. By law, Italy was providing special credit facili-
ties to farmers who purchased domestically-produced agricultural machinery,
resulting in blatant de jure discrimination against imports.
Starting in the mid-1980s, in a series of path-breaking decisions, GATT panels
extended the article III national treatment obligation to de facto discrimination.
In addition, panels tightened article XX, making it much harder to invoke excep-
tions to the General Agreement.
In United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances5 (Su-
perfund), a GATT panel determined that a U.S. superfund tax on imported petro-
leum and petroleum-based products violated article III. While the U.S. tax was
plainly de jure discriminatory in the sense that it singled out imports for higher
taxation, the United States argued that the tax had only a minimal effect on trade,
and thus could not be deemed to nullify or impair benefits under article XXIII.
Rejecting this "no-harm, no-foul" defense, the panel stated:
For these reasons, article 111:2, first sentence, cannot be interpreted to protect expecta-
tions on export volumes; it protects expectations on the competitive relationship between
imported and domestic products. A change in the competitive relationship contrary to
that provision must consequently be regarded ipso facto as a nullification or impairment
of benefits accruing under the General Agreement.6
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-Il, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX [hereinafter GATT] (emphasis added).
5. United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, June 17, 1987, GATT
B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988).
6. Id.
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In United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 (Section 337), a GATT
panel reviewed a U.S. order prohibiting the importation of Dutch aramid fiber,
which had been found to infringe a U.S. patent under Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930. Building on Superfrnd and Italian Tractors,7 the Panel held: "The
words 'treatment no less' favorable in paragraph 4 call for effective equality of
competitive opportunity for imported products in respect of the application of
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of products."- 8 After intensively
analyzing various elements of Section 337 procedure, the panel concluded that
U.S. law discriminated in numerous respects. In short, "equality of competitive
opportunity" had now emerged as the touchstone of article III.
In Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes, and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines
and Alcoholic Beverages9 (Japan Alcoholic Beverages 1), a GATT panel set out
a clear test for de facto discrimination under article III. While Japan's system
of liquor excise taxation was not de jure discriminatory, it resulted in extremely
high taxes on whiskies, vodkas, brandies, and liqueurs, which were primarily
imported; correspondingly low levels of taxation were found on domestically-
produced whisky and shochu-an indigenous Japanese rice wine liquor.
Differential levels of taxation were achieved through peculiar product catego-
ries that drew artificial distinctions between competing imported and foreign
alcoholic beverages, resulting in higher taxes on import product categories, and
by bizarre peaks and valleys in the Japanese liquor excise tax schedule, which
favored domestic products. While the excise tax law did not overtly single out
imports for discriminatory treatment, this was its principal effect. Indeed, it was
difficult to discern any other plausible explanation for the Japanese system, apart
from a thinly disguised effort to favor domestic producers at the expense of
importers: "The panel further found that as a result of this differential taxation
of 'like products,' almost all whiskies/brandies imported from the EEC were
subject to the higher rates of tax whereas more than half of whiskies/brandies
produced in Japan benefitted from considerably lower rates of tax. "'0 The Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages panel set out a straightforward two-step test for evaluating
de facto discrimination under article III:
GATT practice in the application of Article III further shows that past GATT panel
reports adopted by the Contracting Parties have examined Article 111:2 and 4 by determin-
7. "[T]he drafters of the Article intended to cover in paragraph 4 not only the laws and regulations
which directly governed the conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations which
might adversely modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and imported products
on the internal market." Italian Discrimination Against Imported Machinery, Oct. 23, 1958, GATT
B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 64 (1959).
8. Id.
9. Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes, and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 114 (1988) [hereinafter Japan Alcoholic
Beverages Panel Report].
10. Id. para. 5.9(a).
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ing, firstly, whether the imported and domestic products concerned were 'like' and,
secondly, whether the internal taxation or other regulation discriminated against the
imported products."
It explained:
Just as Article I was generally construed, in order to protect the competitive benefits
accruing from reciprocal tariff bindings, as prohibiting 'tariff specialization' discrimi-
nating against 'like' products, only the literal interpretation of Article III:2 as prohibiting
'internal tax specialization' against 'like' products could ensure that the reasonable
expectation, protected under GATT Article XXIII, of competitive benefits accruing
under tariff concessions would not be nullified or impaired by internal tax discrimination
against like products.'
2
After analyzing the objective features and overall coherence of the liquor excise
tax system:
The Panel was unable to find that the differences as to the applicability and non-taxable
thresholds of the ad valorem taxes were based on objective product differences (e.g.,
alcohol content) and formed part of a general system of taxation equally applied in a
trade-neutral manner to all like or directly competitive liquors...'"3
In short, Japan might have been able to justify differential taxation of like
imported and domestic liquors, but it could not show that the differences arose
from the objective application of a coherent overall system of liquor excise taxa-
tion.
In Canada-Import, Distribution, and Sales of Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial
Marketing Agencies, the panel applied the two-part test of Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages I to strike down Canada's restrictive distribution and pricing system
for imported beer and wine:
The panel noted that minimum prices applied equally to imported and domestic beer
did not necessarily accord equal conditions of competition to imported and domestic
beer. Whenever they prevented imported beer from being supplied at a price below
that of domestic beer, they accorded in fact treatment to imported beer less favorable
than that accorded domestic beer.'
4
In short, GATT appeared to have established a straightforward test for de facto
discrimination, which relied on (1) the two-step like product test of Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages I, (2) objective analysis of the overall structure of tax systems
resulting in differential taxation of imported and domestic like products, and (3)
an overall principle of protecting "equality of competitive opportunity" set out
in the Superfund and Section 33 7 panel reports.
In the early 1990s, however, GATT panels apparently had second thoughts
about the "like product" test. In United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic
and Malt Beverages (United States-Alcoholic Beverages), the panel upheld cer-
11. Id. para 5.4(d).
12. Id. para. 5.5(b).
13. Id. para. 5.9(b) (emphasis added).
14. Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing
Agencies, Oct. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27, para. 5.30 (1992).
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tain U.S. state taxes on low-alcohol beer. In its report, the Panel noted "there
was no evidence submitted to the panel that the choice of the particular level has
the purpose or effect of affording protection to domestic production." 5 In short,
United States-Alcoholic Beverages could be read to require proof of protectionist
intent, although it was difficult to know what to make of a brief reference in a
lengthy panel report.
Shortly thereafter, in United States-Taxes on Automobiles (Car Taxes), a
GATT panel confirmed that violations of article 111:2, first sentence, now required
a proof of protectionist "aim and effect." The Car Taxes report was never
adopted, and has fallen into a peculiar oblivion shared by numerous other un-
adopted GATT panel reports. Nevertheless, United States-Alcoholic Beverages
and Car Taxes appeared to apply a much stricter test for proving de facto discrimi-
nation under article III. It was now necessary for the complaining party to prove
protectionist intent or purpose. In part, the new test may have reflected concern
in some quarters of GATT that Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I unduly restricted
domestic environmental regulation, particularly in light of harsh attacks on
"GATTzilla" by Public Citizen, the Sierra Club, and other WTO opponents.
Ill. Back to the Future: Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II
The glory of "aim and effect" was short-lived. In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages
H, the European Community (EC), United States, and Canada again challenged
Japan's liquor excise tax system under article III. In the face of a withering attack
by the EU, the WTO Appellate Body abandoned the "aim and effect" test of
United States-Alcoholic Beverages, and reverted to the two-part like product
analysis of Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I.
After parsing article III, the Appellate Body found no support in the plain
language of article 111:2, first sentence, for "aim and effect." It noted that article
III: 1 states that the broad purpose of the national treatment obligation is to ensure
that internal measures are not "applied to imported or domestic products so as
to afford protection to domestic production." But article 111:2, first sentence,
which deals with discrimination between like products, does not refer to protec-
tionism, only to less favorable treatment of like imported and domestic products.
In contrast, article 111:2, second sentence, which deals with discrimination be-
tween "directly competitive and substitutable" products, prohibits the application
of internal taxes in a manner that affords protection. The Appellate Body reasoned:
There is no specific invocation in this first sentence of the general principle in Article
Ill: 1 that admonishes Members of the WTO not to apply measures 'so as to afford
protection.' This omission must have some meaning. We believe the meaning is
simply that the presence of a protective application need not be established separately
from the specific requirements that are included in the first sentence in order to
15. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1992).
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show that a tax measure is inconsistent with the general principle set out in the first
sentence. 16
Interpreting Article 111:2, second sentence, the Appellate Body also found that
showing that a measure "affords protection" under paragraph 1 also does not
require proof of subjective protectionist intent:
It is not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons legislators often have for
what they do and weigh the relative significance of those reasons to establish legislative or
regulatory intent. If the measure is applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production, then it does not matter that there may not
have been any desire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the legislators or
regulators who impose the measure. 7
Instead, the Appellate Body endorsed Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I, which re-
quired an objective analysis of the overall tax system to determine protectionist
effects:
As in that case, we believe that an examination in any case of whether dissimilar taxation
has been applied so as to afford protection requires a comprehensive and objective
analysis of the structure and application of the measures in questions on domestic as
compared to imported products. We believe it is possible to examine objectively the
underlying criteria used in a particular tax measure, its structure, and its overall applica-
tion to ascertain whether it is applied in a way that affords protection to domestic
products.'8
The Appellate Body's decision in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I revitalized
WTO national treatment discipline. As the Appellate Body showed, the "aim
and effect" test is difficult to square with the literal language of article III. More
importantly, "aim and effect" threatened to eviscerate the evolving application
of "national treatment" to de facto discrimination. After fifty years of experience
with GATT, few governments today engage in overt discrimination. Instead, the
challenge for the WTO is preventing disguised protectionism-subterfuges where
discrimination is cloaked in legitimate regulatory objectives. By definition, de
facto discrimination involves hiding a trade-restriction in an ostensibly facially-
neutral regulation. Any government engaged in such illicit activity is bound to
hide its tracks.
Consequently, by tying article III to a subjective admission by a WTO Member
that an ostensibly legitimate public policy regulation was in fact issued to protect
its domestic industry, "aim and effect" ensured that the GATT discrimination obli-
gations would only apply to the foolish or inept. This contradicted the clear intent
of the drafters of the General Agreement who, by framing discrimination in terms
of an objective "like product" standard in article 111:2, first sentence and article
II1:4, sought to avoid entangling GATT in the morass of subjective intent.
16. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8, WT/DS10, WT/DS 1 (Nov. 1, 1996)
[hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report] (visited July 3, 1998) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm > [hereinafter WTO Website].
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
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"Aim and effect" also undermines the WTO's longstanding institutional objec-
tive of promoting an open, transparent, rules-based global trading system. The
practical consequence is to reward authoritarian and non-transparent govern-
ments, which are in the best position to dissemble about the true motives for
discriminatory laws or regulations. In contrast, in the United States, Canada,
and Western Europe, a combination of transparent government, democracy, a
free press, and the rule of law make it difficult to conceal the real purposes of
a law or regulation.
Finally, by requiring highly subjective elements of factual proof to establish an
article III violation, "aim and effect" threatened to swamp the WTO in litigation,
defeating the core purposes of GATT. With over $5 trillion in annual global trade,
WTO rules that require case-by-case application and detailed, factual inquiries by
panels are unlikely to prove enforceable. Dispute settlement is an important part
of the GATT system, but there were only fifty-odd panel reports adopted in the
history of the General Agreement. A key strength of GATT 1994 was that it
provided clear, largely self-regulating rules for the international trading system.
The principal criticism of the "like product" test has been that it could degener-
ate into a metaphysical inquiry into what constitutes a "like" product, where
arbitrary distinctions as to the characteristic and uses of the products determine
the article III outcome. Because of this, "like product" could slide into a highly
result-oriented analysis where the product is characterized as "like" if the panel
concludes that a regulation's purpose and provenance are dubious, and as "un-
like" if they appear legitimate.
Nevertheless, the "like product" test is consistent with the basic purpose of
article III-ensuring a level playing field for competing imported and domestic
products. Indeed, by tying article III to a protectionist purpose, "aim and effect"
could significantly narrow the scope of national treatment disciplines, since a
regulation can be discriminatory without being overtly protectionist. Indeed, in
most situations, the purpose of disparate treatment is not to stop imports com-
pletely, but to minimize the cost or impact of a regulation on politically-powerful
domestic producers.' 9 Accordingly, some form of "like product" analysis is
essential to any inquiry into alleged discrimination, since it rests on an underlying
determination that the imported and domestic products deserve equal treatment.
The risk of metaphysical and arbitrary distinctions between products can be
avoided by interpreting "like product" in terms of the over-arching purpose
of article III-maintaining "equality of competitive opportunity." The goal of
equality of competitive opportunity offers a real-world benchmark for assessing
whether an internal tax or regulation draws an illegitimate and artificial distinction
19. See, e.g., Superfund and Reformulated Gasoline.
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between imported and domestic products which otherwise deserve a "level play-
ing field."
20
While the purpose of a regulation is-explicitly or implicitly-an underlying fac-
tor in assessing its legitimacy, the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Iand H cases sug-
gest a potential approach: once there has been a prima facie showing that a regula-
tion discriminates under article 111:2 or II1:4, the burden could shift to the defendant
to show that the disparate treatment achieves a legitimate public policy purpose.
This would put the burden on the WTO Member who adopted the measure to explain
away any appearance of discrimination. In the absence of a credible public policy
justification for the disparity, the WTO could legitimately infer it was trade-related,
particularly if the overall structure of the measure suggests that regulatory distinc-
tions were creatively sculpted to single out imports for less favorable treatment or
minimize regulatory burdens on domestic producers.
IV. Tightening Article XX
In the last decade, article XX has undergone a similar evolution toward more
rigorous scrutiny of trade-restrictive measures allegedly covered by GATT excep-
tions. In 1981, in United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products
from Canada,2 a panel characterized then-prevailing GATT practice as follows:
"[T]he practice of panels has been to interpret Article XX narrowly, to place the
burden on the party invoking Article XX to justify its invocation, and not to examine
Article XX exceptions unless invoked." 22 In reality, however, GATT gave broad
latitude under article XX, particularly in the health and safety area. As one commen-
tator put it, GATT panels "studiously avoided limiting in any way the complete
discretion of sovereign governments in the area of health and safety." 23
In United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the European Commu-
nity (EC) challenged a U.S. Section 337 order prohibiting the entry of Dutch
aramid fiber that infringed a U.S. patent. Citing a GATT panel report involving
Spring Assemblies, which had rejected an earlier Canadian challenge to Section
337, the United States argued that Section 337 was "necessary" for purposes
of article XX(d), because the practical limitations of U.S. patent law required
a special procedure aimed exclusively at infringing imports. The panel disagreed:
20. As a practical matter, WTO Members have applied similar "like product" analyses in hun-
dreds of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, without generating much, if any, real
controversy. Under GATT article VI, the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code, and the WTO Agreement
on Antidumping, the domestic industry for purposes of assessing material injury is defined in terms
of the domestic producers of a "like product." While there have been numerous GATT and WTO
challenges to AD/CVD measures, "like product" has not been a major point of contention.
21. Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1983).
22. Id. at 105.
23. Eliza Patterson, International Efforts to Minimize the Adverse Effects of National Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Regulation, 24 J. WORLD TRADE L. 91, 94 (1990).
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It was clear to the panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent
with another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative
measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a
measure consistent with Article III is not reasonably available, a contracting party is
bound to use among the measures reasonably available to it that which entails the least
degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.4
In other words, the Section 337 panel found there is an affirmative obligation
on any party who invokes article XX(d) to show there was no GATT-consistent
measure that was reasonably available to it and that it sought to minimize any
degree of GATT-inconsistency.25 In short, Spring Assemblies was no more.
In subsequent reports, GATT panels put even more teeth into article XX. In
the famous-or infamous-Tuna/Dolphin case, Mexico challenged a U.S. law
prohibiting the importation of Mexican tuna caught using methods that result in
excessive dolphin mortality.26 In the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, tuna often
swim beneath schools of dolphin. Because of this linkage, fishing vessels adopted
a practice of deliberately encircling schools of dolphin in nets in order to catch
the tuna swimming below. This practice of setting on dolphin led to high rates
of dolphin mortality. The United States contended that the import ban was de-
signed to promote dolphin-safe fishing methods, and therefore was protected
under article XX(g) as "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restriction on
domestic production or consumption" or under article XX(b) as "necessary to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health."
The panel clearly was troubled by U.S. efforts to regulate the taking of migra-
tory dolphins located outside its territory, and the imposition of U. S. trade embar-
goes designed to coerce other countries into adopting dolphin-safe fishing methods
corresponding to those required of the U.S. fleet: "The Panel considered that
if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were
accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health
protection policies from which other countries could not deviate without jeopard-
izing their rights under the General Agreement."27
Accordingly, Tuna/Dolphin found that protection of animal life or exhaustible
natural resources outside a contracting party's territory was beyond the scope
24. United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th
Supp.) at para. 5.26 (1992) (emphasis added).
25. See also Thailand-Restrictions on Importation and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7,
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991).
26. See also Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Mar.
22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 114 (1989) (interpreting "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources" under article XX(b) as requiring that the measure be "primarily
aimed" at such conservation).
27. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Apr. 30, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.)
at 155 (1992).
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of article XX(b) or (g). The panel also found that the United States failed to
demonstrate that "it had exhausted options reasonably available to it to pursue
its dolphin protection objectives," 2 e.g., an international dolphin conservation
agreement, as required by the Section 337 report. Finally, it ruled that the U.S.
measures did not qualify as "necessary" under article XX(b) or (g):
The United States linked the maximum incidental dolphin taking rate which Mexico
had to meet during a particular period in order to be able to export tuna to the United
States to the taking rate actually recorded for United States fishermen during the same
period. Consequently, the Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a given point
in time, their policies conformed to the United States' dolphin protection standards.
The Panel considered that a limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions
could not be regarded as necessary to protect the health or life of dolphins. 29
In short, the panel drastically limited the scope of articles XX (b) and (g).
The Tuna/Dolphin report was never adopted, and some of its more sweeping
pronouncements were pared back a bit in United States-Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin 1/).30 Nevertheless, while retreating on some aspects of
article XX, Tuna/Dolphin Itook an even firmer stance on trade embargoes aimed
at forcing changes in the environmental policies of other nations:
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to take trade measures so
as to force other contracting parties to change policies within their jurisdiction, including
their conservation policies, the balance of rights and obligations among contracting
parties, in particular the right of access to markets, would be seriously impaired.3'
V. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures
In the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the GATT and WTO
adopted a fresh approach to GATT article XX by transforming paragraph (b)
into a set of comprehensive rights and obligations governing trade-restrictive
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The WTO Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures32 (SPS Agreement) represents one of the
crowning achievements of the Uruguay Round.33 Governments routinely adopt
S&P measuresM to protect human, animal, or plant life or health. But, as GATT
28. Id.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. For example, in contrast with the earlier panel report, Tuna/Dolphin 11 concluded that extra-
territorial conservation of migratory dolphin could fall within the scope of measures covered by
paragraphs (b) and (g).
31. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, July 1, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
32. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
33. See Patterson, supra note 23, at 94.
34. Sanitary and phytosanitary (S&P) measures consist of laws and regulations which protect
human, animal, and plant life and health from the risk of plant- or animal-borne pests or diseases,
or from additives, contaminants, chemicals, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages,
or feedstuffs.
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article XX(b) recognizes, S&P measures can easily metamorphose into disguised
trade restrictions. It is not uncommon, for example, for countries to prohibit
agricultural imports on the basis of spurious and scientifically unfounded concerns
about pests or disease in order to protect local farmers from competition. While
the SPS talks started as an effort to clarify article XX(b), they evolved into
affirmative multilateral disciplines for S&P measures, including scientific justifi-
cation, risk assessment, transparency, and equivalency.
The SPS Agreement complements the historic Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture, which aims to liberalize international agricultural trade for the first
time. When forced to open protected agricultural markets, some countries invari-
ably will seek to circumvent their WTO commitments to protect their farmers. The
SPS Agreement seeks to close a potential loophole for agricultural protectionism.
Therefore, it represents an important experiment in: (1) imposing stricter disci-
pline over GATT/WTO exceptions; (2) preventing abuse of internal regulations
aimed at protecting food safety, public health, and human, animal and plant life,
and health; and (3) linking WTO scrutiny of domestic internal regulations to
scientific principles.
A. DEFINITION OF SPS MEASURES
The SPS Agreement applies to any measure35 that is applied:
To protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of a Member country
from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, or disease-
carrying or disease-causing organisms;
To protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-carrying organisms in
foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
To protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising
from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establish-
ment or spread of pests; or
To prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests. R
To qualify as an S&P measure, a regulation must protect against one of the risks
listed above. Otherwise, it is outside the scope of the SPS Agreement.37
35. S&P measures can include end product criteria; process and production methods; testing,
inspection, sampling, certification or approval procedures; packaging and labeling requirements
directly related to food safety; and quarantine requirements.
36. SPS Agreement, supra note 32, annex A.
37. The WTO draws a clear distinction between measures covered by the SPS Agreement and
those covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT or Standards Agreement).
Article 1.4 of the SPS Agreement provides that it does not affect rights or measures covered by the
TBT Agreement. For its part, article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement clarifies that standards disciplines
do not apply to SPS measures.
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B. BASIC SPS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Article 2 lays out the basic rights and obligations of the SPS Agreement. These
rights and obligations are explained or further elaborated in subsequent articles of
the Agreement. The SPS Agreement strives to strike a balance between permitting
governments to take legitimate measures to protect public health and preventing
disguised protectionism.
1. Right to Take SPS Measures
Article 2.1 makes clear that WTO Members have a right to take S&P measures
"necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health."
2. Obligation to Apply Only to Extent "Necessary"
Under article 2.2, a WTO Member must ensure that any S&P measure "is
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life, or
health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5 [which
provides for provisional regulations in situations involving scientific uncer-
tainty]." 39 The U.S. Uruguay Round Statement of Administrative Action (SAA)
clarifies that:
It is clear that the requirement in the S&P Agreement that measures be based on scientific
principles and not be maintained 'without sufficient scientific evidence' would not
authorize a dispute settlement panel to substitute its scientific judgment for that of
the government maintaining the sanitary of phytosanitary measure. For example, by
requiring that measures be based on scientific principles (rather than, for instance,
requiring measures to be based on the 'best' science) and not to be maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence (rather than, for instance, requiring an examination of the
'weight of evidence'), the S&P Agreement recognizes . . .that scientific certainty is
rare and many scientific determinations require judgments between differing scientific
views. °
3. Unjustifiable Discrimination and Disguised Trade Restrictions
Article 2.3 provides that S&P measures shall not "unjustifiably discriminate
between members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between
their own territory and other Members."-41 In addition, S&P measures "shall
38. While the language reaffirming the rights of governments to adopt SPS measures is fundamen-
tal to the Agreement, what is new is the imposition of WTO disciplines on future SPS measures.
As one U.S. environmental expert put it, "many commentators have been distracted by this language
about 'rights' and have missed the fact that the purpose of SPS was to impose obligations." Steve
Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization, Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1779, 1781 (1997).
39. SPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 2.2.
40. Statement of Administrative Action, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773 [hereinafter SAA].
41. SPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 2.3.
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not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade." 42 These provisions were drawn from the chapeau to article
XX and are further elaborated in article 5 of the SPS Agreement, which deals
specifically with "risk assessment" and "appropriate level of protection."
C. HARMONIZATION
The SPS Agreement seeks to promote harmonization around international stan-
dards, even though it allows WTO Members to adopt more stringent SPS measures
if they follow certain procedures.
1. International Standards
Article 3.1 calls on Members to adopt international standards where they exist.
Annex A defines relevant "international standards" as those promulgated by the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, International Office of Epizootics, the Interna-
tional Plant Protection Convention, or other international organizations identified
by the WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee.
Under article 3.2, SPS measures that "conform to" international standards
are deemed necessary to protect human, animal or plant life under SPS article
2.1 and are presumed consistent with the SPS Agreement and GATT 1994. A
country challenging an international standard has the burden of rebutting the
presumption of validity. In practice, this rule should operate as a virtually airtight
defense in the WTO.
2. Right to Promulgate Higher Standards
Article 3.3, however, explicitly reaffirms the right of governments to promul-
gate standards that result in a higher level of S&P protection if (1) there is a
"scientific justification" or (2) as a result of"the level of sanitary of phytosanitary
protection a Member determines to be appropriate." Article 3.3 further clarifies
that a standard shall not be deemed inconsistent with SPS obligations merely
because it results in a different level of protection than an international standard.
In short, a WTO Member is not required to accept a lower international standard
or "harmonize downward," as long as it has a scientific justification or desires
a higher level of protection.
D. EQUIVALENCE
Article 3.1 requires WTO Members to accept the S&P measures of other
Members as "equivalent" if such measures achieve the same level of protection.
The exporting Member has the burden of demonstrating equivalence. "Equiva-
42. Id.
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lence" is a breakthrough for the WTO, because it recognizes that different stan-
dards, production processes, and inspection procedures can achieve the same
levels of health and safety protection. Thus, article 3.1 offers a remedy against
the longstanding refusal by certain countries to allow the importation of farm or
food products, because of inconsequential differences in another WTO Member's
inspection or food safety standards, which do not pose an increased threat to
human, animal, or plant life or health.
E. "RISK ASSESSMENT" AND "APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF PROTECTION"
Article 5 requires WTO Members to ensure that S&P measures are based on
a "risk assessments" and on a determination as to the "appropriate level of
protection." Because measures that conform to international standards are pre-
sumed consistent with the SPS Agreement, the procedures set out in article 5
are relevant primarily in situations where a WTO elects to adopt a higher standard.
1. Risk Assessment
Article 5.1 requires that any standard be based on a risk assessment. Annex
A of the SPS Agreement defines a "risk assessment" as:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease
within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and economic
consequences; or an evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal
health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins, or other disease-
carrying organisms in food, beverages, and feedstuffs.43
While the SPS Agreement does not specify a particular methodology for conduct-
ing a risk assessment, it requires Members to take certain factors into account,
such as "available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production meth-
ods; relevant inspection, sampling, and testing methods; prevalence of specific
diseases or pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological
and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. "44
2. Appropriate Level of Protection
Upon conducting a risk assessment, a WTO Member is free to choose its
"appropriate level of protection." Annex A defines this level as one that the
Member thinks appropriate in establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure
to protect human, animal, or plant life or health within its territory. In other words,
as long as there is scientific evidence of risk, a WTO Member can determine
how much risk it wants to assume. The U.S. URAA SAA explains: "The S&P
Agreement thus explicitly affirms the right of each government to choose its
43. Id. annex A.
44. Id.
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level of protection, including a 'zero risk' level if it so chooses . . .In the end,
the choice of the appropriate level of protection is a societal value judgment." 45
In situations where the science is insufficient or unclear, a WTO Member may
adopt a provisional SPS measure based on the "available pertinent information,"
as long as it continues to seek additional information for a more objective assess-
ment of risk under paragraph 7.
3. Unjustifiable Discrimination and Trade Restrictions
While providing WTO Members with broad flexibility as to their "appropriate
level of protection," the article 5 incorporates certain disciplines drawn from
GATT article XX. These are set out in paragraphs 4-6:
1. Members shall "take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects."
(article 5.4)
2. Members shall avoid "arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers
to be appropriate .. .if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade." (article 5.5)
3. Members shall ensure that "measures are not more trade-restrictive than required
to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection..."(article
5.6)
A footnote to paragraph 6 clarifies that "a measure is not more trade-restrictive
than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into
account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level
ofsanitary orphytosanitaryprotection and is significantly less restrictive to trade"
(emphasis added).
F. TRANSPARENCY
Under article 7 and annex B, WTO Members are required to ensure the transpar-
ency of S&P measures, including publishing such measures, maintaining an office
with relevant documents and information, advance publication for notice and
comment of proposed measures which are not based on international standards,
and transition periods to allow trade to adjust (except in an emergency).
G. CONTROL, INSPECTION, AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES
Article 8 and annex C deal with control, inspection, and approval procedures
for S&P measures.
VI. Hormones
The WTO recently issued a major decision regarding the SPS Agreement-
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones). The Hormones
report is important because it (1) represents the first interpretation of key provi-
45. SAA, supra note 40, at 745.
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sions of the SPS Agreement, and (2) suggests how the WTO's Appellate Body
may handle future scientific disputes.
In Hormones, the United States and Canada challenged a European ban on
imports of meat and meat products from cattle treated with growth hormones.
EC Directives banned the sale of domestic and imported meat treated with certain
natural and synthetic growth hormones. The Directives provided exceptions for
hormones administered by a veterinarian for certain therapeutic or zootechnical
purposes, and for certain natural hormones permitted by regulations of the Mem-
ber States. Treating cattle with hormones is a common practice in the United
States and Canada, but not Europe.
To the extent a lawyer is only as good as his or her facts, the EC's Legal
Services Office had a difficult job. The Codex Alimentarius, which annex A of
the SPS Agreement identifies as the international standard for veterinary residues,
recommended that ingestion of hormones in accordance with good animal hus-
bandry practice is "unlikely to pose a hazard to human health." Similarly, the
studies and recommendations considered by the EU in promulgating the Direc-
tives concluded that hormones were unlikely to pose a health threat.
The panel ruled that the United States had the initial burden of presenting a
prima facie case that the EC's Directives were inconsistent with the SPS
Agreement: "Once such a prima facie case is made, however, we consider that,
at least with respect to the obligations imposed by the SPS Agreement that are
relevant to this case, the burden of proof shifts to the responding party.' 46 Im-
portantly, the panel held that since articles 3.3 and 5 were "exceptions" to the
requirement that SPS measures be based on international standards, "the burden
is on the respondent to show that the measure is justified under the exceptions
provided for in Article 3.3.
'
-47
Applying article 3.1, the panel equated the phrase "based on" in article 3.1
with the phrase conform to" in article 3.2. It concluded that in order to be "based
on" an international standard, an S&P measure must achieve the same level of
protection. Since the EC's standard was not the same as the Codex standard, it
was subject to articles 3.3 and 5, which set out special requirements for S&P
measures aimed at a higher level of protection.
The panel found the EC Directives did not comply with the article 5 requirement
that such measures be based on a risk assessment, because there was no evidence
that the EC "actually took into account a risk assessment when it enacted or
maintained its sanitary measure ... ,,48 After reviewing various studies cited
by the EC, the panel noted the studies uniformly concluded that hormones applied
46. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-Report of the Panel, WT/
DS26/R/USA, para. 8.51 (Aug. 18, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 16 [hereinafter Hormones
Panel Report].
47. Id. para. 8.86.
48. Id.
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in a manner consistent with good practice were "unlikely" to pose a health threat.
It rejected the EC's argument that it was still entitled to adopt a standard that
achieved "zero risk":
We recall the conclusion we reached above on burden of proof, in particular that the
European Communities has, with respect to its measures which deviate from interna-
tional standards, the burden of proving the existence of a risk assessment (and derived
therefrom, an identifiable risk) on which the EC measures in dispute are based. It is
not, in this dispute, for the United States to prove that there is no risk. 9
The panel concluded: "[I]f there is no scientific evidence of an identifiable
risk, there is no basis on which to adopt a measure to achieve a level of sanitary
protection. "' While the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the EC Direc-
tives violated the SPS Agreement, it adopted a very different rationale.
A. BURDEN OF PROOF
The Appellate Body ruled that the panel erred in allocating the burden of proof.
While it agreed that the United States had the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie violation of the SPS Agreement, it concluded this burden applied to
each provision of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body flatly rejected the
panel's characterization of article 3.3 as an "exception" to the SPS Agreement:
"It is clear . . . that a decision of a Member not to conform a measure to an
international standard does not authorize the imposition of a generalized or special
burden of proof upon that Member, which may, more often than not amount to
a penalty."'-5
Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that the United States, as complainant,
must make a prima facie showing as to each alleged violation of the SPS
Agreement:5 1 "Only after such a prima facie determination has been made by
the panel may the onus be shifted to the European Communities to bring forward
evidence and arguments to disprove the complaining party's claim."
53
49. Id. para. 8.150 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-AB-1997-4-Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), at WTO Website, supra note
16 [hereinafter Hormones Appellate Report].
52. This reasoning is consistent with the Appellate Body's decision in United States-Measure
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, which rejected India's characterization
of the safeguard provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing as an "excep-
tion." The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's decision to shift the burden of proof to the United
States as the defending party. WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 16.
The transitional safeguard mechanism provided in article 6 of the ATC is a fundamental part of
the rights and obligations of WTO Members concerning non-integrated textile and clothing products
covered by the ATC during the transitional period. Consequently, a party claiming a violation of a
provision of the WTO Agreement by another Member must assert and prove its claim (emphasis
added).
53. Hormones Appellate Report, supra note 51, para. 109.
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B. "BASED ON" REQUIREMENT
Applying article 3.1, which requires that S&P measures shall be "based on"
international standards, the Appellate Body rejected the panel's conclusion that
"based on" in article 3.1 can be equated with "conforms to" in article 3.2:
Under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, a Member may choose to establish an SPS
measure that is based on the relevant international standard, guideline or recommenda-
tion. Such a standard may adopt some, but not necessarily all, of the elements of the
international standard. The Member imposing this measure does not benefit from the
presumption of consistency set up in Article 3.2; but, as observed earlier, the Member
is not penalized by exemption of a complaining Member from the normal burden of
showing a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 3.1 or any other relevant
article of the SPS Agreement or of the GATT 1994.-
In other words, the class of measures "based on" an international standard
for purposes of article 3.1 is broader than the class of measures which "conform
to" the international standard, i.e., achieve the same level of protection. For
WTO purposes, only those measures that "conform to" the international standard
are presumed consistent with the SPS Agreement. As a result, there may be
certain measures which, while exactly not the same as the international standard,
still qualify as "based on" that standard for purposes of article 3.1. After examin-
ing the EC Directive, the Appellate Body concluded it was more stringent than
the relevant international standard, and therefore subject to article 3.3.
C. RISK ASSESSMENT
Under article 3.3, a WTO Member who seeks a higher level of protection
than an international standard must comply with the additional procedural require-
ments of article 5.1. Interpreting "risk assessment," the Appellate Body con-
cluded that articles 2.2 and 5.1 should be read together, and in conjunction, they
require a risk assessment to be "based on scientific principles" and "sufficient
scientific evidence":
We ... would also stress that Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should be constantly read together.
Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1: the elements that define the basic obligation set out
in Article 2.2 impart meaning to Article 5.155
While rejecting the panel's interpretation that a risk assessment must be based
on an "identifiable risk," the Appellate Body 56 nevertheless stiffened the require-
ments for a valid risk assessment through a different rationale. The panel had
concluded that article 5.1 requires a risk assessment to be "taken into account,"
54. Id.
55. Id. para. 180.
56. "To the extent that the Panel purported to require a risk assessment to establish a minimum
magnitude of risk, we must note that the imposition of such a quantitative requirement finds no basis
in the SPS Agreement. A panel is authorized only to determine whether a given SPS measure is
'based on' a risk assessment." Id. para. 186.
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implying that it is sufficient to show that government officials "actually" read
and considered the risk assessment.
The Appellate Body interpreted article 5.1 in different fashion to require an
objective relationship between the standard and the risk assessment:
We believe that 'based on' is appropriately taken to refer to a certain objective relation-
ship between the two elements, that is to say, an objective situation that persists and
is observable between an SPS measure and a risk assessment . . . We believe that
Article 5.1, when contextually read as it should be, in conjunction with and as informed
by Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, requires that the results of the risk assessment
must sufficiently warrant-that is to say, reasonably support-the SPS measure at stake.57
In other words, an SPS standard must bear a rational relationship to the scientific
risk assessment which underlies it. Otherwise, it is not based on "sufficient
scientific evidence" for purposes of article 2.2 and 5.1.
D. ZERO RISK
Despite employing somewhat different reasoning, the Appellate Body agreed
with the panel's bottom-line that the EC could not adopt a policy of "zero risk,"
in the face of underlying scientific evidence showing hormones were unlikely
to pose a threat to human health:
In one part of its Reports, the Panel opposes a requirement of an "identifiable risk"
to the uncertainty that theoretically always remains since science can never provide
absolute certainty that a given substance will not ever have adverse health effects. We
agree with the Panel that this theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of risk which, under
Article 5.1, is to be assessed. 8
E. SUFFICIENT SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
In short, through an alternative route, the Appellate Body, like the panel, sought
to infuse a degree of scientific rigor into the risk assessment. While rejecting the
panel's notions of "identifiable risk" and a minimum "magnitude of risk," the
Appellate Body nevertheless found that the EC had violated articles 5.1 and 5.2,
because it had never furnished a risk assessment "that reasonably supports or war-
rants the import prohibition embodied in the EC Directives. . ."9 In other words,
a risk assessment need not find a minimum quantitative threshold of risk, but it
must bear a rational and objective relationship to science.
F. ARTICLE 5.5
While the Appellate Body upheld the basic integrity of the article 5.1 risk
assessment, it may have weakened article 5.5 and its goal of consistent application
57. Id. paras. 189 and 193.
58. Id.
59. Id. para. 208.
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of S&P protection. The panel had held that the EC violated article 5.5 by drawing
arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions between different types of risks, particu-
larly the disparate treatment of (1) hormones used for growth promotion and (2)
carbonax, an anti-microbial agent and known carcinogen.
The purpose of article 5.5 is to require WTO Members to adopt relatively
consistent levels of protection for various risks, in order to prevent risks found
predominantly in imported agricultural products from being treated more strictly
than roughly equivalent risks found in domestically-produced food products. The
Appellate Body held that article 5.5's requirements are cumulative. Accordingly,
it must be shown that three separate requirements are met to establish a violation:
(1) adoption of different levels of sanitary protection in different situations; (2)
the differences are "arbitrary or unjustifiable;" and (3) the differences result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.6°
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the EC's prohibition of growth
hormones on the one hand, and tolerance of unlimited residues of carbonax and
olaquidox on the other, resulted in different treatment. It also agreed that this
difference was "unjustifiable" for purposes of article 5.5.
The Appellate Body disagreed, however, with the panel on whether the distinc-
tion resulted in discrimination or a disguised trade barrier. The panel had relied
on a combination of factors to support its inference that the growth hormones/
carbonax distinction resulted in de facto discrimination or a disguised trade restric-
tion, including (1) the EC's multiple objectives in banning hormones, which
allegedly including reducing beef surpluses, and (2) the much lower percentage
of European cattle treated with growth hormones than in the United States or
Canada. The Appellate Body stated that a finding of discrimination "is not sup-
ported either by the architecture and structure of the EC directives here at stake
• . . or by the subsequent evidence submitted by the United States and Canada
to the panel."'
Accordingly, the Appellate Body struck down the panel's findings on discrimi-
nation and disguised trade restrictions, although its decision appeared to turn
more on factual considerations, than definitive legal interpretations of article 5.5.
The Appellate Body did state there was insufficient evidence to show the EC
directives "were not really designed to protect its population from the risk of
cancer, but rather to keep out US and Canadian hormone-treated beef and thereby
to protect the domestic beef producers. ,,62 This may imply that article 5.5
requires a showing of protectionist intent, but it can also be read simply as a
rejection of the panel's factual inferences. Time will tell.
60. Id. para. 214.
61. Id. para. 246.
62. Id.
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VII. Future Issues
While the Appellate Body clarified key SPS provisions in Hormones, it left
much for another day.
A. PRIMA FACIE CASE
While the Appellate Body made clear that the complaining party bears the
burden throughout of establishing a prima facie case as to each alleged violation,
it remains unclear how much of an obstacle this represents. If prima facie case
is interpreted to require a high threshold of initial proof, it could be difficult
for WTO Members to challenge protectionist SPS measures under article 3.3,
particularly since the defendant possesses the critical information as to the risk
assessment and scientific evidence that went into its decision to adopt a higher
level of protection. Unless the Appellate Body sets a reasonable threshold for
establishing an initial prima facie showing, or forces WTO defendants to disgorge
critical information underlying a challenged SPS measure, there may be tactical
opportunities to stonewall SPS Agreement disputes.
B. NON-QUANTIFIABLE RISKS
By holding that a risk assessment is not limited to identifiable, quantifiable
risks, the Appellate Body opened some room for non-science factors. The Appel-
late Body stated that a risk assessment may go beyond the "scientific laboratory
operating under strictly controlled conditions" to "the actual potential for adverse
effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die.' ,
63
The Appellate Body clearly wanted to provide scope to deal with control and
enforcement concerns.64 It may also have wanted an additional margin of safety:
e.g., for human irrationality and unpredictability; for children, who may not
know better; or for other factors not susceptible to strictly quantitative analysis.
But it would be disastrous if the WTO were to permit risk assessments based
on pure emotion, e.g., risk of ensuing public hysteria, scientifically unjustified
fears of genetically-altered foods, "consumer preferences," inability of most
Japanese to digest foreign beef, etc. The scope for such non-quantifiable factors
presumably remains subject to the Appellate Body's over-arching rule that there
must be an objective relationship between the scientific risk assessment and an
SPS measure. If so, the WTO will continue to demand that SPS measures be
supported by some level of sound science. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body's
ruling on this point calls for further clarification, and no doubt will provoke
future disputes as WTO Members try to exploit a potential loophole.
63. Id.
64. Id. para. 206.
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C. OBJECTIVE RELATIONSHIP
The Appellate Body's interpretation of article 5.1, which requires an objective
relationship between a standard and the underlying risk assessment, also deserves
clarification. While such a test can only be elaborated on a case-by-case basis,
the WTO must avoid the twin shoals of condoning protectionist abuses on the
one hand by not demanding sufficient scientific rigor, and unduly second-guessing
WTO Members by preventing them from take precautionary measures in situa-
tions of scientific uncertainty on the other.
D. SUMMARY OF ARTICLE III AND XX AND SPS DEVELOPMENTS
In the last decade, the WTO and GATT have made important strides toward
strengthening article III; tightening article XX, bringing science into S&P mea-
sures; and striking an appropriate balance between protecting sovereign regulatory
authority and preventing protectionist trade barriers. Panels have built on the un-
derlying objectives of the GATT and WTO Agreements to advance an open, trans-
parent, rules-based trading system. In the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages cases,
GATT and the WTO developed an effective test for de facto discrimination. Despite
occasional overreaching, GATT succeeded in effectively limiting the potential for
open-ended abuse of article XX. In Hormones, the Appellate Body and panel upheld
the fundamental integrity of the SPS Agreement by insisting that SPS regulations
be based on a risk assessment and some degree of sound science.
While the Appellate Body has yet to establish a clear track record, trends are
already evident. The Appellate Body is skeptical of tests requiring proof of subjec-
tive intent. In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages H, it abandoned the new "aim and ef-
fect" test, reverting to an interpretation of article 111:2, second sentence, which
calls for an objective inquiry into the structure, underlying criteria, and overall
application of the tax system to ascertain whether a measure affords protection. It
adopted a similar approach in Hormones, by construing article 5.1 to require an
"objective relationship" between an S&P measure and the risk assessment, and
by overturning the panel's ruling that article 5 requires a subjective showing that the
risk assessment was "actually considered" by the relevant government authorities.
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body's emphasis on strict constructionism may also
mean that some aspects of article XX jurisprudence are vulnerable. In interpreting
the WTO, the Appellate Body has relied heavily on the plain meaning of the WTO
texts and on rules of treaty construction set out in the Vienna Convention. In con-
trast, key elements of recent article III and XX jurisprudence by GATT panels have
drawn more from inspiration and the underlying principles of the GATT/WTO than
from the four corners of the GATT and WTO Agreements. 65 In United States-
65. Indeed, in Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body offered tantalizing hints that, while
none of the parties had contested the issue, it might have been prepared to reconsider the "primarily
aimed" test of Herring and Salmon. WT/DS2/AB/R, 18 (Jan. 29, 1996), at WTO Website, supra
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Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the Appellate Body made
clear that it would require panels to stick closely to the texts of the WTO and GATT
in interpreting article XX. 66 This means some aspects of existing article XX juris-
prudence may be vulnerable in the Appellate Body.
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In recent years, the WTO has been fiercely attacked by some environmental
groups, e.g. the Sierra Club, which have criticized an open, rule-based global
trading system as a fundamental threat to U.S. regulatory sovereignty. While
any U.S. commitment to a system of multilateral rules and obligations necessarily
involves some trade-offs, the environmental critique may also reflect certain
misconceptions about the WTO. Accordingly, it is useful to clarify how GATT
and WTO rules apply in the area of food safety, and what this implies for broader
environmental regulation.
F. OBJECTIVE PRODUCT DIFFERENCES
GATT article III clearly permits different regulatory treatment when there are
objective physical differences between imported and domestic food products:
e.g., physical contamination; spoilage; toxic chemicals; or diseases, which
threaten human, animal, or plant life or health. The WTO would almost certainly
find such products are not "like" for purposes of article III, as long as there is
a public health threat.
While the issue has never been tested in the WTO, this rule almost certainly
extends beyond food safety to objective physical differences that are tied to
valid environmental objectives, e.g., whether a product is made of recyclable
materials. It is worth emphasizing that article 111:2, second sentence, prohibits
tax differentials between products which, while not "like," are "directly
competitive," but there is no counterpart in article 111:4, which covers internal
regulations. Accordingly, article 111:4 appears to grant more leeway with re-
spect to differential regulatory treatment of "directly competitive" products
than differential taxation.
A word of caution: if a panel concluded that meaningless physical differences
were be used as a pretext for discrimination or protection in a regulation, it could
adopt an expansive definition of "like product" in order to bring such measures
within the ambit of article 111:4 discipline. In other words, the more comprehen-
note 16. ("Accordingly, we see no need to examine this point further, save, perhaps, to note that
the phrase 'primarily aimed at' is not itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus
test for inclusion or exclusion from Article XX(g).")
66. While the Appellate Body's focus on the literal wording of the WTO Agreements may mean
that some aspects of article XX doctrine are in jeopardy, it may also reflect caution about getting
too far afield, while the appeal process is still establishing its legitimacy. For obvious reasons, it
is difficult to criticize a legal ruling that is based on strict constructionism.
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sive the application of an environmental law or regulation, so that regulatory
burdens are shared across-the-board by domestic and foreign producers, the more
likely it is to withstand WTO scrutiny. Coincidentally, comprehensive measures
may also represent sound environmental policy, since they are likely to lead to
more effective environmental protection than regulations which are arbitrarily
sculpted to exempt domestic polluters.
G. PRODUCTION PROCESSES AND METHODS
While differences in production processes and methods (PPMs) do not necessar-
ily result in physically distinct "like products" for article III purposes, such
measures are likely to be exempted in most instances by the GATT article XX(b).67
But, even if a PPM regulation could be initially challenged under article III for
different treatment of like products, it is almost certainly protected by article
XX(b) if it deals with legitimate food safety concerns. The drafters of GATT
clearly were aware that governments needed authority to prohibit or regulate
products manufactured through inadequate or inferior PPMs, which pose a greater
risk to human, animal, or plant life or health, even if such risks do not lead to
actual verifiable physical contamination.
The SPS Agreement enhanced WTO discipline with respect to regulation of
food safety PPMs by requiring, for example, that S&P measures be based a
scientific evidence and a risk assessment, and recognize the principle of equiva-
lence. These requirements are unlikely to pose much of a threat to U.S. food
safety laws and regulations, which are based on sound science. But, the SPS
Agreement offers an important offensive weapon for the United States against
the protectionist subterfuges we frequently encounter in some of our trading
partners.
In the "trade and environment" debates, a key point of contention is PPMs
which lead to environmental degradation. GATT article XX(g) provides an excep-
tion for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption." 68 Accordingly, U.S. environmental measures de-
signed to conserve exhaustible natural resources located in U.S. territory are
likely to withstand future WTO challenges, as long as they apply across-the-board
to domestic and foreign producers under paragraph (g).
The Tuna/Dolphin rulings make clear that U.S. regulations designed to con-
serve natural resources outside U.S. territory-in international waters or in the
territories of other WTO Members-are vulnerable in the WTO. This is particu-
67. Different production methods may result in the same "like product" for article III purposes.
68. GATT, supra note 4, art. XX(g).
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larly true when the regulations are coercive, i.e., U.S. trade sanctions are designed
to force other WTO Members to adopt U.S. environmental policies. 69
However, less intrusive regulatory approaches for dealing with objectionable
foreign PPMs might still withstand WTO scrutiny. The Tuna/Dolphin panel em-
phasized, for example, that non-discriminatory labeling requirements are per-
fectly permissible under article XX.
Similarly, in Thai Cigarettes, a GATT panel endorsed across-the-board restric-
tions on cigarette advertising under article XX, even though it recognized that
the impact could fall disproportionately on importers trying to enter the market.
The Tuna/Dolphin and Thai Cigarettes reports suggest that the WTO may show
greater tolerance for less intrusive forms of regulation, as opposed to trade restric-
tions or prohibitions.
Even if the WTO restricts future environmental sanctions, such measures are
sometimes of questionable utility. While some environmentalists appear to place
great faith in the coercive power of U.S. trade sanctions, this may be short-sighted.
It is true that many critical environmental challenges, such as conserving global
resources, protecting common species, controlling trans-border pollution, or pro-
tecting the ozone layer, cannot be solved without international cooperation. But
such cooperation probably cannot be achieved or sustained through U.S. coercion
alone, and even then such a strategy can impose extremely high costs in terms
of foreign cooperation on other U.S. objectives, e.g., national security, trade,
and unrelated environmental initiatives. In many cases, long-term cooperation
requires persuading our trading partners, particularly the less-developed coun-
tries, that sound environmental policies and sustainable development practices
are in their own interest and do not carry an excessive cost. While the threat of
U.S. trade sanctions can help draw attention to a problem, sanctions often have
a corrosive long-term impact on international cooperation, and risk a counter-
productive foreign backlash against "eco-imperialism," which could put legiti-
mate U.S. environmental objectives at risk.
VIII. Conclusion
The SPS Agreement offers a promising model for the WTO. Infusing science
into SPS measures has helped bring rigor and discipline to a potentially wide-open
GATT/WTO loophole. Coordinating with other international organizations, such
as the Codex, has strengthened the WTO by bringing in vital scientific expertise
and tying WTO standards to a multilateral scientific consensus. Finally, the en-
dorsement by the Appellate Body in Hormones of using independent experts to
advise panels on complex scientific issues may offer a solution to the most glaring
weakness of the current GATT and WTO dispute settlement mechanism-
69. Indeed, some aspects of the GATT's Tuna/Dolphin rulings may be vulnerable, because of
the WTO Appellate Body's strict constructionism.
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the difficulty panels face in sorting through complex and conflicting factual
evidence.7 °
At the same time, the WTO must continue to strike a balance between promoting
open trade and safeguarding legitimate government regulation of the environment,
public health, and food safety. Article XX, for example, could be usefully updated
to explicitly authorizing trade-restrictive measures to implement intergovernmen-
tal environmental agreements, e.g., the Basel Convention, CITES, and the Mon-
treal Protocol. Such a provision was incorporated in several early drafts of the
GATT, but was dropped at the end for reasons that remain unclear.7' Like the
SPS Agreement, future WTO initiatives could usefully promote international
environmental cooperation, since most trans-border pollution, wildlife, and re-
source management issues cannot be solved by the United States alone.
The WTO faces enormous challenges managing the continued dynamism of
the global trading system. However, it can draw inspiration from the men and
women who drafted GATT in 1947. The document they put together has endured
for over fifty years, helping launch a period of unparalleled global prosperity,
and has emerged as the unchallenged charter for bringing world trade into a new
century.
70. Because Panels are composed of diplomats or government officials, as opposed to full-time
judges, they lack the time to wade through detailed stacks of evidence. The Panel process itself is
ill-suited to deal with situations where the parties disagree about the underlying facts. Finally, because
the WTO/GATT process is rooted in diplomacy, Panels sometimes appear reluctant to challenge a
government which may not be telling the truth. Instead, Panels often appear to take factual assertions
at face value.
71. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, article XX, referring to Havana Reports, at 84-5.
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